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LAWYER OF THE AMERICAS
NEGOTIATION OF THE SETTLEMENT
Mark Feldman: I would like to thank you, Alan, for your kind
invitation to these gentle climes at this time of year. It is a fascinating
subject for me. I have been working on virtually nothing else for the
past several months, but it is always good to get new perspectives. I
have never been in a gathering like this from which I have failed to
learn something new about these agreements and the problems that
we have ahead of us in implementing them. To the extent I can recall
and have the information, I would like to share with you a bit about
the negotiating history of the agreements. It is hard to say whether it
is all terribly relevant to the legal analysis but it may be of general
interest.
Those of you who saw the ABC spectacular' on the failed negoti-
ation efforts over the months know as much as I do about those
endeavors. Most of those negotiations were very closely held and
generally came to naught. The efforts leading to the successful release
of our people have really received much less attention in the media.
They began roughly in September with some private contacts made
through a German channel. These resulted in some very secret meet-
ings, held in Germany, all of which coincided approximately with the
publication in Tehran of Khomeini's four conditions3 for the resolu-
tion of the crisis. The question which I think political scientists and
historians will be debating for years to come is, "What led to this
change in thinking on the part of the Iranian authorities over the past
many months?" In retrospect, I think the American officials conduct-
ing this diplomacy were well aware from the beginning that the
problem was severely compounded by the absence of any kind of
recognized authority in Iran capable of taking the responsibility or
political risk of doing business on a matter this sensitive. As the
Iranians began to go through their constitutional process-the process
of forming their institutions-President Bani-Sadr's office took on the
hostage question. I suppose it did so on the basis of the rational
judgment that it was not in Iran's interest to isolate itself from the
international community, and possibly also out of a political judg-
ment-which may have been a misjudgment-that keeping the crisis
going would strengthen the hand of the Islamic Republican Party. As
it turned out, the hostage issue became a weapon in the hands of the
fundamentalist coalition in its power struggle with Bani Sadr. For a
2. "Secret Negotiations: America Held Hostage" (first broadcast Jan. 22, 1981).
3. The four conditions were: waiver of claims; release of the assets; noninter-
vention in Iran's internal affairs; and recovery of the Shah's wealth.
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long time it seems to me-and it is only a personal view-that their
need to have that instrument in the domestic political conflict really
made it fundamentally impossible to have any kind of negotiated
settlement. But over time, once the mullahs achieved their political
dominance in the Majlis and in the Prime Minister's office, there came
a point at which they no longer needed the hostage crisis. Perhaps
they may have seen it as a weapon in the hands of still more radical
elements in the political spectrum in Iran.
There was also the sanctions program. One should not underesti-
mate the effect on Iran, economically, of the asset freeze4 and related
trade sanctions. 5 Although our allies did not do all that we wanted,
they did more than some people expected. That, I think, was a
problem for Iran.
In any event, for whatever reason, by September they seemed to
have made a decision to resolve the crisis. Then the Iraqi war inter-
vened. At first no one really knew how it was going to affect the
situation. It cut both ways. For a while, the war suspended forward
movement on the matter, but in the end, perhaps it gave solution of
the crisis greater urgency.
Since Khomeini had decreed that the decision was in the hands of
the Majlis, the first important step to getting the negotiations under-
way was for the Majlis to act and to interpret, in a formal way,
Khomeini's four conditions. This it did. The Majlis' four conditions
were basically consistent with what Khomeini himself had said, but
spelled out in more technical detail the waiver of claims, the release of
the assets, nonintervention in the internal affairs of Iran, and recovery
of the Shah's wealth, with some elaborations on those four themes. In
that context, the negotiations eventually started. They became serious
with the proferred good offices of the Government of Algeria.
Next, it became necessary for Lloyd Cutler,6 Warren Chris-
topher, 7 Bob Carswell8 of the Treasury and the others to decide how
to respond to the Majlis' points. They decided, as I perceive it, to
position the United States as accepting the demands laid down by the
Majlis, and then, since the demands were general enough, to make
specific responses explaining exactly how we intended to implement
each. In the process of articulating the details we would be able,
4. Exec. Order No. 12170, 44 Fed. Beg. 65, 729 (1979) [for text, see infra
Appendix at 61].
5. 31 C.F.R. § 535, Subpart B (1980) [for text, see infra Appendix at 141].
6. Counsel to the President.
7. Deputy Secretary of State.
8. Deputy Secretary of the Treasury.
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appropriately, to hedge the commitment of the United States. This
was done initially by preparing a full-fledged set of Executive orders
to carry out the various points of the program with many qualifica-
tions. At one point, consideration was actually given to having the
President sign these Executive orders and having them carried, fully
executed, over to the Iranians.
One must realize the very difficult conditions under which these
negotiations were being carried out. We had no direct access to the
Iranians. There was no opportunity for the exchange of views. We
were still uncertain whether they could get themselves together and
take responsibility for any compromise of any kind. We were totally
dependent on the Algerians for communicating between the two ne-
gotiating teams. Under these circumstances, the Carter Administra-
tion perceived that it was going to be a difficult negotiation, with only
a limited amount of time to carry out a very complex operation. The
effort was made, therefore, to position everything as much as possible
so it could just be accepted without a lot of exchanges. Moreover, the
Iranians weren't too happy about the details. They had a lot of
trouble, from both a technical and bureaucratic point of view, coping
with the flood of paper we sent over there. They just wanted to have
some very basic principles. They had laid down the law, we would do
what they asked, and that was all.
Another interesting aspect is the Iranians' consistent choice of
negotiating through the media. At one point they were unhappy that
the United States would not make a public statement. Instead, we
kept giving them documents, secret explanations, and so forth. That
was not their style at all. Nevertheless, our negotiators held firm. We
did not accept the premise of negotiating through the media. Also, of
course, there was a bank negotiating track to the settlement process
which began in private channels but in the end merged into the
official negotiations. I would prefer to let Bob Mundheim tell us about
that effort. He was in those negotiations at an early stage and then in
the final days.
Skipping a lot of details, the negotiations were progressing rea-
sonably well, given the difficult circumstances, until December-just
before Christmas. The Algerians had spent quite a number of days in
Iran and we were bringing the negotiations to a head. It, therefore,
came as a great shock to everyone in Washington to learn that Iran
was demanding a $24 billion fund as a guarantee for the United States
commitments with respect to the restoration of Iran's assets and recov-
ery of the Shah's estate. I am not sure we know, even now, how that
set of demands developed, but the general impression is that they were
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added at the very last moment by the more radical elements in the
Islamic Republican Party coalition who just were not ready to see the
hostages go. Of course, it is also true that they did not trust us to honor
any negotiated agreements once we got our people back. This was
particularly the case with respect to the return of the Shah's estate.
The Iranians asked-if I remember the figures now-for almost $10
billion in assets of theirs, which was just a little off the amount we had
computed for their assets in this country. They asked for another $4
billion in an escrow fund as a guarantee for other assets which they
thought might be out there somewhere in the United States, but
which we did not know about or were not telling them about. Finally,
they demanded a $10 billion reserve fund as a guarantee that we
would live up to our commitments in regard to the return of the
Shah's assets.
It was striking that the Algerians did not bring this proposal to
Washington personally, as they had been doing up to then. They sent
it to their embassy in Washington and the Ambassador then brought it
over. It may be that they understood just how impossible the proposal
was. I do not know whether the Algerians wished to disassociate
themselves from the proposal, whether they thought the negotiations
were over, or whether they were just plain exhausted because they
had been working around the clock for days and days. But they did
not come with it and there was deep pessimism in Washington; some
even thought of breaking off the negotiations. A serious question arose
over whether we ought to continue the process in the face of this kind
of behavior. Finally the judgment was made not to break the link. It
had taken almost a year to develop the channel of communication
with Iran through the Algerians, and it was decided that, while we
were going to reject the proposal categorically, we would continue the
negotiating process. When that position was communicated to Al-
giers, along with a few substantive points as to how we might respond
to the demands, the Algerians immediately came to Washington and
began some very serious negotiations.
I do not necessarily have access to all that went on in that period,
but I wondered at the time, and I wonder now, whether the Algerians
had not talked with the Iranians about backing off their proposal.
Also, when the Algerians made their decision to return to Washing-
ton, I suspected then and I suspect now that they may actually have
had some indication that the Iranians would back off. The Iranians
must have realized that they had made a fundamental error in pre-
dicting the U.S. reaction. Maybe it was something they could not
control. But in all events, they must have known they would have to
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back off the request for the $10 billion reserve. There was a fire storm
of reaction against the proposal, particularly in the European and
Japanese press. At no point in the whole affair, except at the time of
the original hostage taking itself, was public opinion so spontaneously
and universally angry with the Iranians. That had to have had some
effect. All of their lawyers, from Europe and the United States, must
have advised them that it was impossible for the United States to
accept the proposal from a legal, as well as political, point of view. So
I do not exclude the possibility that they reassessed the situation and
gave the Algerians some incentive to go forward with the negotia-
tions.
Then ensued a process which did not culminate until January 20,
1981. In this process, Iran never answered the question, and we never
knew, whether they had withdrawn the proposal for the $10 billion
reserve. They just kept doing business with us on all the other issues,
and gradually we began to get the idea that they had effectively
abandoned it and that we were not going to hear about it anymore.
One never knew until the very last moment, however, whether that
shoe would drop and ruin the whole thing. How they managed to deal
with it internally I cannot say.
In any event, between Christmas and New Year's Day, when the
discussions had progressed on the asset issues, it became opportune to
take up the claims settlement agreement as an agenda item. We
presented a draft agreement to the Algerians and had a substantive
negotiation with them in Washington. Several of the less than optimal
features of the final agreement were the result of compromises made
in response to Algerian advice on how the Iranians might react to
particular issues. Then the Algerians took a package back to Tehran
which included a claims settlement agreement. By this time the docu-
ments were in the form of proposed declarations by the Government
of Algeria. It was clear the Iranians were not going to sign an agree-
ment with the United States and that was the form in which it was
thought that the agreement could be concluded.
There came a moment in mid-January, around the 12th of Janu-
ary, when it became clear that the Iranians were prepared to release
the hostages upon the recovery of their own assets. But they wanted
those assets-all of those assets-to be put into an escrow account
before the hostages were released. It was a proposal close in concept to
our own, but we had hoped that the hostages could be returned and
the details-the claims settlement and other issues-worked out after-
wards. Here, for the first time, the Administration had to come to
grips with the question of what we could do before the hostages were
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released; what conditions we would accept for the release of the
hostages.
It was perceived that we had control, or at least more control,
over the Iranian assets in the overseas branches of U.S. banks. These
assets were not subject to attachment by non-bank claimants, al-
though there were set offs against those deposits by the banks them-
selves. We also thought we could move the bullion and securities
being held in the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. There was much
less certainty about our control over the other deposits subject to
attachment. It would take time to litigate the validity of the Treasury
orders revoking the attachments. There was great concern over how
long that litigation would take, and whether the hostages could be
released in a reasonable period of time. Then finally, the presidential
transition came into focus. President Carter had lost the election;
January 20th was approaching. If the United States accepted Iran's
proposal, the Reagan Administration would have to implement
Carter's committments, and it was not clear that they would do so.
This issue was reviewed with President Carter; an assessment was
made of the attitudes of the incoming Administration, and the Presi-
dent made a decision that he would only approve a deal that would
bring the hostages home by January 20.
So, a message was sent off to Algiers telling them that our figure
was on the general order of $7.5 billion. They came back and said:
"No deal." We came to a real crisis in the negotiations and, as a result,
Warren Christopher was sent to Algiers. The purpose of this trip (it
was originally to be a two day visit) was to explain to the Foreign
Minister of Algeria why the United States could not go beyond that
figure and that we really meant it. It was not an easy task. It was not
the least of Warren Christopher's many achievements in these negoti-
ations that he did persuade the Algerians of this fact. The Algerians
are very sophisticated people, but the peculiarities of the American
political and legal system are not easy to grasp. In the end the Alger-
ians did accept the fact that this was the limit of the U.S. negotiating
position, and the negotiations proceeded from there. Christopher
never returned home until after the change of power in Washington.
Now, the other major points in the negotiating history revolved
around the banks. Perhaps Bob Mundheim should tell us something
about that. Would you, Bob?
Robert Mundheim: The best current reference with respect to the
involvement of the banks is the testimony that John Hoffman' gave
9. Partner with Shearman & Sterling, New York, N.Y., Citibank's principal
outside counsel.
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before the Senate Banking Committee. ' 0 Early in the game, Citibank
thought about settlement as a way of resolving the problems it faced.
In February 1980, its representatives came to the Treasury to discuss
generally some principles on which they were working and to explore
the Government's view. At the time, Citibank had litigation going in
four countries: the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and
Germany. It was looking for a signal from Iran on whether settlement
of those suits was possible. In other words, it viewed the lawyer-to-
lawyer channel as an additional channel through which problem-solv-
ing talks might go forward. John Hoffman initially felt that France
would probably be the place he would get the signal because the
litigation in Paris seemed to be moving along at the most rapid rate.
But, in fact, the signal came through the German lawyers toward the
beginning of May 1980. As the discussions with the German lawyers,
and, ultimately, with the Bank Markazi proceeded, the English and
American lawyers got deeply involved and a basic approach was
formulated. The notion was to use Iran's overseas deposits to pay off
the liquidated debts, with the further notion that when this was done
there would be something left over to give back to Iran. That was the
carrot to make the deal. The concept was also that the domestic bank
deposits would be used to pay off unliquidated claims.
Those discussions and the actual drafting of docments went fo-
ward, I understand, until the middle of November 1980. During that
time Hoffman kept the Treasury and State Departments informed
about the negotiations. It was always understood that a sine qua non
of working out any bank settlement had to be the release of the
hostages.
In the middle of November, word came from Tehran that the
basic plan to use the overseas assets to pay off liquidated debts in full
was unacceptable. The explorations then moved toward a so-called
"bring current" formula for dealing with loans from the banks. The
"bring current" formula essentially meant that Iran would pay off the
interest and principal owing on the loans up to the date of settlement
and then give some form of further promise to pay the balance of the
loans that were still outstanding in accordance with their terms. The
formula also anticipated the negotiation of additional security for
those promises. Work on this "bring-current" formula went forward
for a month-and-a-half until the Iranians, sometime during the see-
10. Hearings on Iranian Assets Settlement Before the Senate Committee on Bank-
ing, Housing and Urban Affairs, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981)(statement of John
Hoffman) [for text, see infra Appendix at 233].
SETTLEMENT WITH IRAN
ond full week of January, indicated that they were rejecting the plan.
On January 15th, the Iranians, for reasons I cannot fully explain,
although there is a good deal of speculation about why, suddenly
reverted to the first plan. And that was the plan that ultimately
provided the basis for settlement. So, on January 15th, through a very
unexpected Iranian initiative, the negotiations were back to the origi-
nal plan, and the negotiators had basically five days in which to
prepare the documentation.
Mark Feldman: Let me just comment before you go on. From my
perspective, as one player, this announcement of Iran's proposal to
pay off all of the U.S. bank loans was the moment when the possibili-
ties for settlement really crystallized. That was the turning point. The
Iranians were having a great deal of trouble agreeing to the guaran-
tees-collateral and so forth-for which the banks were asking under
the "bring current" plan. There was a requirement to go to the Majlis
for some of those guarantees. That was definitely not on. This was
clear and it may have been one of the considerations that led to their
ultimate rejection of that plan. I don't know. But, in all events, we
got the strong message, as of that moment, that the Iranians wanted
to get this problem off their back. They wanted to deal. In the
process, however, they came up with an asset figure that was more
than we had available from the sources I described earlier. It was
more than $8 billion; $8.1 billion, I think. We thought about that. I
have not told this to Bob, but we finally decided that the reason why
the Iranians came up with that figure, and would not move off it, was
because over a period of several months the coordinated Government
position to the press was that the Iranian assets exceeded $8 billion.
We believe that it was because of that position the Iranians insisted
upon $8.1 billion.
At this point I just want to describe briefly what happened when,
on Thursday night, January 15th, the Iranians announced their will-
ingness to pay-off the bank loans in full. Bob Carswell and his col-
leagues at the Treasury Department got on the phone and brought the
bank negotiators-the bankers and their lawyers-to Washington for
an all-day meeting presided over by [Treasury] Secretary [G. Wil-
liam] Miller and Secretary [of State Edmund] Muskie at the State
Department on Friday, January 16. It was really a tremendous under-
taking. While Iran's announcement was a great step forward, it repre-
sented a total change in signals. There were only five days left until
the inauguration. The figures and documentation were not available.
There was real doubt whether the United States could pull the deal
together in five days' time. There were twelve principal depository
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banks and more than fifty lending banks. The Treasury decided that
the only way to get the job done was to bring representatives of the
depository banks together. They worked all day on two big issues:
first, how to get from $7.5 to $8.1 billion, and second, since the
Iranians had proposed paying $3.7 billion immediately and holding
$1.4 billion in escrow, who was going to get the $3.7 billion and who
was going to wait. Both of these issues were worked out during the
course of that one day. The bottom line on the numbers was $7 billion
and Iran finally accepted that. On the order of payment it was agreed
that the syndicated loans would be paid off immediately in full and
the nonsyndicated loans would be paid out of the escrow. Bob, if you
would pick up the story from there. You were in London at that time.
Robert Mundheim: Yes. I had gone to London on Wednesday,
January 7th, and met the following morning with the officials from
the Bank of England. The purpose of the mission was to persuade the
Bank of England to be the stakeholder. If we were going to have an
escrow agreement pursuant to which funds would be deposited and
then distributed according to specified instructions and on the hap-
pening of predescribed events, somebody had to hold the money. That
had to be someone in whom both sides had confidence and who had
experience in the kind of complicated financial transfers involved.
Since most of the overseas money was in England, it seemed sensible
to explore the matter first with the Bank of England. Next, having
had some discussions on Thursday and Friday with the Bank of En-
gland, Ernie Patrikis, who is the Deputy General Counsel of the
Federal Reserve Bank of New York, and I went to Frankfurt to
explore the willingness of the Bundesbank to act as stakeholder. Then,
on Monday morning [Jan. 12], we flew back to London to pick up
again our discussions with the Bank of England. As the process wore
on, the Bank of England indicated that it would be willing to serve.
Indeed the Germans had indicated that they too would be willing to
serve, but the Iranians ultimately felt that the Bank of England was
the preferred stakeholder. That judgment was based on an assessment
of the safety of the funds from attachment. The worry was that once
the funds were transferred to the stakeholder, and while the parties
waited for the primary condition to be satisfied-namely, release of
the hostages-someone would attach the funds so that if and when the
hostages were released the funds could not be paid over. It was
thought that the funds would be more secure from attack in London
than in Germany. Obviously, things were moving so quickly that it
was questionable whether anybody could get into court fast enough to
do anything about it, but we all worried about it and, being careful
lawyers, it became an important issue.
